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ROBERT SMITH,

Petitioner.

v.
DOUG DRETKE. Director.

TexasDepartmentof Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United StatesCourt of Appeals
For the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON
MENTAL RETARDATION, THE ARC, THE JUDGE
DA VID L. BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL
HEALTH LAW, THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
PSYCHIA TRY AND THE LAW, AND T ASH
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE.
THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION ON MENTAL
RETARDATION (AAMR). foundedin 1876,is the Nation's
oldestand largestinterdisciplinaryorganizationof professjon. This brief was written entirely by counselfor amici, as listed on the
cover, and not by counselfor any pany. No outsidecontributionswere
madeto the preparationor submissionof this brief. Both partieshave
given written consentto the filing of this brief.

2
als in the field of mental retardation. AAMR hasappearedas
amicuscuriae beforethis Court in numerouscases.
THE ARC OF THE UNITED STATES (formerly the
Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States).
through its nearly 900 state and 1oca1chapters.is the largest
national voluntary organizationin the United Statesdevoted
solely to the welfare of the mo:-;;than sevenmillion children
and adultswith mentalretardationand their families.
THE JUDGE DAvm L. BAZELON CENTER FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW (BAZELON) is a national public
interest organization founded in 1972 to advocate for the
rights of children and adultswith mentaldisabilities. Bazelon
has written model laws, advocatedfor protective legislation,
and participated either as counselor amicus curiae in
virtually all cjvil casesconcemjngmental disability law that
have come before the U.S. SupremeCourt, most recently in
Olmsteadv. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), as well as jn right to
refusemedjcatjoncasessuch as Riggins v. Ne\'ada, 504 U.S.
127(1992) and Washingtol'\'. H(Jrper,494 U.S. 210 (1990),
THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHIATRY AND
THE LAW, wjth approximately 2.500 members worldwjde, js

an organization of psychiatrists dedjcatedto excellence in
practice,teach.ing,and researchin forensicpsychiatry.
TASH (previously known as The Associationfor Persons
with Severe Handicaps) is an international association of
people with disabilities. their family members, other
advocates.and professionalsconcernedwith human dignity.
civil rights. education.and independencefor all individuals
with disabilities.
SUMMARY

01-' THI-: ..\RGUMENT

When this Court decidcd:\tkin.\ ,.. \ 'i,..~inia.536 U.S. 304
(2002), it did not eliminalc or allcr the central teaching of
Penry v. Lynaugh. 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Pen,..v):that jurors

3
must be given an unobstructed opportunity to evaluate
relevant mitigating evidence about a capital defendant.
Evidence that an individual defendant has a cognitive
impairment.. is vitally relevant to the evaluation by jurors
whether death is an appropriate penalty.
The Fifth Circuit's fonnula of prerequisites that a
defendant must satisfy before being accorded the jury
consideration guaranteed by this Court in Penr.,' is both
unwarranted and unreasonable. Its requirement of a judicial
pre-detennination of a causal nexus between the disability
and the crime strips the jury of its proper role in evaluating
that crucial and contextually subtle question. The Court of
Appeals' requirements that the disability be demonstrated to
be permanent and "uniquely severe" are similarly unjustified.
A cognitive impairment shapes the individual's understanding of the world and his ability to function in life.
Whether its source is a traumatic brain injury, dementia
incident to another medical condition, or an intellectual
impairment that places the defendant outside the definitional
boundary of mental retardation, the opportunity to consider
its mitigating significance in deten11iningwhether a defendant
should be executed is central to the jury's function.

The obstaclesplaced by the Fifth Circuit in the path of
jurors' fair consideration of a defendant's condition are
inconsistentwith this Court's teachingsabout the fundamental importance of the jury's role in determining the
appropriatepenalty in capital cases.

.. Amici use the tenD ""co!!nitive impairment" or ""cognitive disability"
throughout this brief to des~ribe several disabilities involving
substantially impaired intellcl1ual fun~tioning. including traumatic brain
injuries, various fonDSof dem~ntia"and int~llectual impainnent which fall
shon of the definition of ""mentulretardution."

4

ARGUMENT

I. IMPOSING BARRrrRS TO PREVENT JURORS
FROM CONSIDERINGMITIGATING MENTAL
DISABILITY EVIDENCE IS UNJUSTIFIABLE.
Central to the Eighth Amendment's protection in capital
casesis the opportunity for jurors to weigh the significanceof
mitigating evidence,enabling them to evaluatethe appropriateness of imposing the death penalty. Denying jurors
the opportunity to give meaningful consideration to such
evidencepreventsthem "from giving independentmitigating
weight to aspectsof the defendant'scharacter" and "creates
the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of
factors which may call for a less severepenalty." Lockett "'.
Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
Perhaps the most widely recognized example of such
mitigation is evidenceof a defendant'scognitive disability,
"because of the belief, long held by this society, that
defendantswho commit criminal actsthat are attributableto a
disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental
problems,may be lessculpablethan defendantswho have no
suchexcuse." California \'. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). The principle reflected in this
societal understandingabout mental disability led this Court
to require Statesto give jurors a meaningful opportunity to
considerevidenceof a defendant'smental retardation.Penry
\'. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302. 328 (1989) (Penry). This same
principle prompted an increasing number of States to
categorically prevent the imposition of the death penalty
on defendantswith mental retardation. and culminated in
this Court's recognition of the existence of a national
consensusagainstthe practice. Aikins \'. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 316 (2002).
While the Eighth Amendment's categorical protection
announcedin Atkins is limited to defendantswho havemental

5
retardation, the relevanceof the mitigating significance of
mentaldisability evidencerecognizedin Pen,:,'is not. Capital
jurors weighing the fate of defendantswho presentevidence
of substantially impaired intellectual functioning must be
afforded an unimpededopportunity to consider whether the
individual's mental impairmentmakeshim lessculpablethan
defendantswho have no such excuse. Any rule that denies
jurors this critical opportun~tyshould be supportedby an
exceedinglypersuasivejustification, and the Fifth Circuit has
offered none.
A. The Fifth Circuit's Requirements Effectively
Precluding Jury Consideration Of Substantial
Cognitive Disabilities Are Unwarranted.
The Fifth Circuit has created a test that keeps relevant
mitigating evidenceof a defendant'scognitive disability from
the jury. The Court of Appealscharacterizedthe holding in
Penry as providing an opportunity for the jury to consider
mitjgating evidence"becausethesecharacteristicswere due
to the unjquely severepennanenthandicapswith which the
defendant[Penry] was burdenedthroughno fault of his own."
Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009, 1029 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
banc), affd, 506 U.S. 461 (1993). This description of the
evidence submjtted by Penry and the rationale for its
considerationin his casewas then reified into a prerequisite
for any defendant seeking an instruction pennitting jury

consideration
of mitjgatingevidence.Madden1'. Collins, 18
F.3d 304, 308 (5th Cir. 1994). Un1essevidenceof mental
impainnent offered by a defendantfalls within this "narrow
class," Robison v. Johnson, 151 F.3d 256, 263 (5th Cir.
1998), jurors are precluded from evaluating its potentially
mjtigating significance outside the confines of the special
questionsof the then-applicableTexasstatute.
While mental retardationis a "pennanent'.and substantjal
disability, whjch is experienced by affected indivjduals
"through no fault of their own," it does not logically follow

6
that all other cognitive impainnents that are not perfectly
identical, in every respect,to mental retardationare unworthy
of jury considerationaspotentialI: mitigating evidence. Each
component of this screening "test," devised by the Fifth
Circuit in Madden to prevent the consideration of mental
disability evidence,is deeplyproblematic.
The Fifth Circuit's requirementthat a disability must be
found to be "uniquely severe"before a jury can considerit is
both unclear and unwarranted. If the intention in using the
word "unique" is to assertthat the reasoningof this Court's
opinion in Penry has no possiblerelevanceor applicability to
evidence of any cognitive impainnent other than mental
retardation,then the requirementis merely tautological.' If,
on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit's intention is to suggest
that no other fonn of mental disability is even remotely
comparableto the impainnent experiencedby people with
mentalretardation,then it is obviously in error. For example,
an individual with a cognitive disability that manifesteditself
in adulthood (such as a traumatic brain injury, or dementia
associatedwith Alzheimer's diseaseor the later stagesof
AIDS) would not satisfy the definition of mental retardation
in most States,2yet the disability can be equally severeand
disabling. It defies reasonto contendthat such an individual
is so fundamentally dissimilar from someonewith mental
J

Of course,if the principlesannouncedin Penry are inapplicableto

any condition except mental retardation, then this Court's decision ceased
to have any significance, since, under Atkins, people with mental
retardation are now ineligible for the death penalty. Nothing in either
Penry or Atkins suggestssuch a result.
2 Although most statutory definitions of mental retardation limit its
scope to disabilities which arose "during the developmental period," e.g.,
CONN.GEN. STAT. § 1-lg(a) (2000); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309 n.3, at least
two States focus solely on the individual's intellectual deficit and its
impact on adaptive behavior. without reference to the age of the
disability's onseL NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(3) (Supp. 2000); N.M.
STAT.ANN. § 3 1-20A-2. I(A) (Michie Supp. 2000).

7
retardationas to precludea Penry instruction. Similarly. an
individual whosemeasuredintelligence
indicatesa substantial
...
impairment falling just short of the threshold of mental
retardationwill encountermost of the samelimitations as a
person who has mental retardation.3 To deny such a
defendant'sjury the opponunity to evaluate the mitigating
significance of his disability is fundamentally incompatible
with the reasoningofPenr.v.4
The Fifth Circuit's insistence that a defendant's disability,
in order to be evaluated by a jury, must be "permanent" is
equally unwarranted. It is certainly true that for most
individuals, mental retardation is a lifelong condition,5 and it
is also true that a number of other cognitive disabilities can be

3See generally M.K. Simpson & J. Hogg, Pauerns of Offending
Among People ~'ith Intellectual Disability: A SystematicRe,'ie~'. Part II:
Predisposing Factors, 45 J. Intell. Disability Res. 397, 402 (2001) ("the
association between offending and intellectual ability appears to be
strongestin the borderline range"').
4 As indicated above, this Coun's holding in Atkins requires defining
the scope or exemption from the death penalty. There is no comparable
necessity, or even rationale, for arbitrarily denying other defendants with
cognitive disabilities the opponunity for individualized culpability
assessmentguaranteedin Pel1r.,'.
SAs this Coun has noted. the definition of mental retardation requires
both a significant intellectual impairment (placing the individual at least
two standarddeviations bellI" the mean in measuredintelligence) and an
impact of that impairment ()11the individual's ability to function in
society. SeeAtkins. 536 U.S. at J()9 n.3: Penry, 492 U.S. at 308 n.1. See
generall.,' Cleburl1e \'. Cleb"rnc' Li\'i",~ Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985)
("reduced ability to cope" ith ,md fUl1l:li()nin the everyday world").
While we lack the technology III measurahly increasean individual's basic
cognitive ability. pr()viding .lppropri,lte suppons may allow some
individuals to improve their ,,"illt)' to ful1l.:lionin society to a level that is
no longer consistent with the definition of mentalretardation.
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similarly enduring.6 But a disability's pennanenceor impermanencehas no bearing on its appropriateconsiderationas
potentially mitigating evidence. The potentii.llrelevanceof a
defendant'smental disability to the sentencingprocessis the
light it may shedon the individual's culpability at the time of
the offense. Penry, 492 U.S. at 323: Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319.
Whetherthe defendantwas similarly impaired at someother
point in time may help evaluatethe legitimacy of the disability claim,7 but it does not directly illumine the individual's
level of culpability. Indeed, under both principles of mens
rea and the defenseof insanity, a temporarymentalcondition
at the time of the offense, if sufficiently disabling, may
preclude conviction altogether.8 The Court of Appeals has
offered no justification for arbitrarily denying jurors the
opportunity to weigh the significanceof such a disability for
the much more limited (but incontrovertibly momentous)
purposeof choosingbetweendeathand life as a punishment.9
6

See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of Mental Disorders 152 (4th ed., text rev. 2(xx» ("Dementia may be
progressive, static, or remitting. ") [hereafter "AP A, DSM -W -TR"].
7 For

example,if there is documentationof the disability at an earlier

stage of the individual's life, it may help dispel any concerns by the jury
that a defendant may be malingering, and, similarly, the persistenceof the
disability past the time of the offense may permit clinicians to conduct a
more thorough psychological evaluation. But the unavailability of such
evidence is unrelated to the relevance of the individual's disability.
8 See, e.g., Beardslee \', United Stales, 387 F.2d 280, 293 (8th Cir.
1967). See generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and
Death~'orthiness: Differentiat;",!,' Be(M.et"I'Guilt and P"nishnlent in Death
Pel,alry Cases,66 Fordham L. Rev. 21. 75 n.307 (1997).
9 While the Fifth Circuit provides no ju~tification for limiting the availability of Penry instructions to ca...esinvol"ing '.permanent" cognitive disabilities, its purpose may have been to dr:Jw a distinction between mental
retardation and a defendant's youth. ,\"('('.I.',',,£'rall.\'
Jolmson v. Texas, 509
U.S. 350, 368-69 (1993). But a~ this Coun explained, youth is uniquely
amenableto being considered under the ~~~i:J1question of future dangerousness precisely because juror~ would instin~tively recognize the
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It is similarly unjustified to insist that a defendantmust
demonstratethat he played no role in the etiology of his
cognitive disability before the issue can'be consideredby a
jury. Onceagain,the Fifth Circuit hassing1edout an attribute
of mentalretardation(as describedin Penr.\').andgeneralized
it into a prerequisitehurdle before a Pem:r instructioncan be
given in casesinvolving other cognitive disabilities. It is true
that most defendants who have a substantial cognitive
impainnent acquired their disability without any personal
responsibility for its occurrence.IOBut the fact that this is
true of defendants with mental retardation, and of most
individuals with other significant cognitive impainnents,does
not justify its imposition as an obstaclebarring jurors' full
consideration of the potential1y mitigating significance of
other defendants' cognitive disabi1ities. For example, an
individual who has a substantialcognitive disability resulting
from an earlier traumatic brain injury should be able to have
it consideredby a jury regardlessof the precisecauseof his
injury. I I If jurors concludedthat a particulardefendant'srole
relevance of its quintessential impermanence. Jd. By contrast, other
cognitive disabilities are like the mental retardation evidence in Penry, in
that the jury cannot have confidence that the defendant will have an
opponunity to emerge from its effects later in life and thereby to learn
from his mistakes. Requiring the defenseto prove the permanenceof the
disability before the jury can be given an opponunity to consider its
mitigating potential servesno identifiable purpose.
II)See generally Seymour L. Halleck et al., The Use of Psychiatric
Diagnoses in the Le,t,'ol Pr()("es.r:Task Force Report of the American
Ps.vchiatric Associatioll. 2() Bull. Am. Ac.:ad.Psychiatry & Law 481, 494
(1992) ("Patients are g\.'l1\.'rally nor h~ld responsible (in clinical
interactions) for symptoms a,,(~'iated "irh cognitive impairments. . . .").
II For example. if an indlvldu~ll.~ traull1atic brain injury resulted from
an earlier motor vehi<:leal.l'id\.'nl. it should not matter, in deciding whether
to give a Pellry in~truction 111a c.:apital~ase. if the defendant bore some
responsibility for the origln~11al"<:idenl(e.g.. a determination regarding
comparative negligen<:ein a t{)n acti()n ari~ing from the accident, or a

determinationthat defendantshould have been wearing a helmet while

]0

in the etiology of his disability was relevant to its mitigating
significance, they could. of course, impose the death penalty.12 But there is no justification for placing the question
beyond their "effective reach." Cf. Graham \', Collins. 506
U.S. 461, 475 (1993). 13

Eachof thesecomponentpartsof the Fifth Circuit's barrier
to the jury's reasonedevaluationof mitigating evidenceof a
defendant's cognitive impairment is loosely connected to
Penry only in the sensethat eachis a characteristicof menta)
retardation. But none of thesecomponentsnegatesthe re)eriding a motorcycle). Seegenerally Bragdon \'. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641
( 1998) ("In the end, the [statutory] disability definition does not turn on
personal choice.").
12The intuitive expectation that jurors will be more sympathetic to
mitigating circumstances that affected a defendant's culpability through
no fault of his own appearsto be borne out by social scienceresearch. See
Stephen P. Garvey, Aggra\'ation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What
Do Jurors Think?, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1538, 1564-65 (1998). Bur this
observation does not support the contention that mitigation claims where
the defendant's complete lack of responsibility for his condition is not
proven to a judge must be withheld from jurors' consideration. Rather, it
suggeststhat jurors are fully capable of evaluating whether a particular
.defendant's cognitive disability, in light of all the evidence presented,
renders the death penalty inappropriate.
13As was true with "unique severity" and "permanence," the Fifth
Circuit has failed to provide a rationale for this "nonresponsibility"
limitation, but it seems likely that the intention was to preclude
consideration of impairments caused by a defendant's voluntary use of
alcohol or illegal drugs. The issues surrounding the relevance of such
substanceabuseto criminal sentencing has been widely debated for many
years. See, e.g., MODELPENALCODE§ 210.6(4)(g) (1985); HardK'ick v.
Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1167-69 (11th Cir. 2003); People \'. Leger,
597 N.E.2d 586, 611 (Ill. 1992); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§§ 5HI.4, 5K2.13 (amended October 27, 2003). But concern about that
separateand distinct issue provides no justification for a generalized and
imprecisely-targeted requirement that all defendantsdemonstratethat they
had nothing to do with the origin of their cognitive impairment before that
disability can even be considered by a jury.
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vanceof a defendant'scognitive limitation to his individual
culpability. And none of them renders the defendant.s
disability more amenable to fair consideration within the
confinesof the specialquestionsframeworkat issuehere.

B. The Fifth Circuit's "Nexus" Or "Causation"
Requirement Is Both Unjustified And
Unworkable.
Under the prerequisitesimposed by the Fifth Circuit, a
defendantis deniedan opportunityto havea jury considerthe
mitigating significance of his cognitive disability unless he
has satisfied a judge of the adequacyof a causal "nexus"
betweenthe crime and the disability. Madden, 18 F.3d at
307. As was the case with the categorical restriction of
eligible disabilities, there may be a superficial attractiveness
to requiring some demonstrated connection between a
defendant's disability and the offense, but, upon closer
inspection, the Fifth Circuit's limitation on the jury's
considerationof the issueprovesto be unwarranted.
Although the law frequently confronts complex questions
of causation,14none is more difficult than determiningwhen
an attribute of a defendant's background or cognitive
limitations "caused" the behavior which constitutes the
offense for which he is prosecuted. And when the law has
attempted to address this issue in a fashion that is too
reductionist and simplistic, it has encounteredunsatisfactory
results.15 Because of the intricate relationship between
14 SeegenerallyWayneR. laFave. Criminal Lak'

§ 6.4 (4th ed. 2003);

RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)OFTORTS§§ 431-32 (1965); H.L.A. Hart & A.
M. Honore. Callsalion in Ih(' LaK' (1959): Michael S. Moore. Causation
and the Excuses.73 Calif. L. Rev. 1091 (1985).
ISSee, e.g., D"rham ". (fniled Siaies. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954);
United States v. BraK'"er. 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See also Gary
B. Melton. John Petrila. NOmli1nG. P()Ylhress& Christopher Siobogin.
Psychological E\'altlalio"s!or Ihe CoI,rls 197-98 (2d ed. 1997).
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individual mental characteristicsand human behavior. the
Fifth Circuit's insistenceon demonstratinga causal nexus
before the jury is pennitted to evaluate evidence of a
defendant'scognitive limitations.can fare no better.
The criminal law seldom encounterscases in which a
defendant'scircumstancesor mental disability has rendered
his behaviorinevitable,in the sensethat anyonewho had that
condition would have actedidentically.16 Nor can it ever be
demonstratedthat only a person who shared defendant's
condition would havecommitted this particular offense. But
just becausethe connectionbetweena cognitive impairment
and the commission of a crime does not fit neatly into a
"but-for" explanation does not eliminate the often powerful relevance of that disability in understanding an
individual's actions.
A defendant's cognitive impairment can be vitally
important in assessingthe level of culpability for his offense.
The disability may help us understandthe individual as "less
culpablethan defendantswho have no suchexcuse." Bro}1'n,
479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concurring).17 But determining whether, in a particular set of circumstances,his
action is "attributable" to his impairment, id., will call for

16Seegenerally Antony Honore, Principles and Values Underlying the
Concept of Causation in LaH', in Causatioll in LaM' and Medicine 3, 5
(Ian Freckelton & Danuta Mendelson eds.. 2002) ("In the world of
physics we can specify rather precisely what conditions will lead to what
outcomes. . .. Organic matter is less easy to analyse in terms of causal
sequencesbecauseliving creaturesare complex. Members of a speciesdo
not react in a uniform way.}.
11M.K. Simpson & J. Hogg. ,'illpra note 3. at 401-02 ("[P]ersonal and
social problems tend to be cumulative. This makesany attempt to identify
which factor causes any other almost impossible, and the attempt
possibly unhelpful.").
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thoughtful assessmenth.v rile
factors.IK

}llr.\'

of a wide variety of

The connection between a defendant'scognitive impairment and his actionsderivesfrom the limitations imposedby
the disabling condition.19A personwith suchan impairment
has an understandingof the world (and of his actions)that is
altered,and often distorted,by the prism of his disability. Its
profound and pervasive effects on his experiences and
abilities in life, including his moral reasoning and understandingof the consequences
of his actions, are not directly
identifiable from a telltale indication on a diagnosticimaging
of his brain, nor are they marked by some "behavioral
chromosome"that can be detectedthrough an analysisof his
DNA. But the fact that the link between an individual's
cognitive impairmentand his behaviorcannotbe conclusively
IKAmici do not, of course, mean to suggestthat the issueof causation is
irrelevant to the mitigating consequence of a defendant's disability.
Obviously, the reasona defendant's disability matters in sentencingis that
it helps the sentencerunderstand the defendant's act. See generally U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.13 (requiring, for a downward
departure, that "the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed
substantially to the commission of the offense.'). But under the federal
Guidelines, the judge is the sentencer. Our concern is with the Fifth
Circuit using the "causation" or .'nexus" prerequisite finding to keep the
sentencerin Texas capital cases,the jury, from considering the relevance
of the defendant's disability.
19 While, as a general matter, this conclusion will also be true for
defendants with mental illness, there may be some cases in which an
individual's conduct may be more directly traceable to an attribute of his
mental disease. For example, a defendant who offers evidence that his
crime was in response to a command hallucination (which was an acute
symptom of his psychotic illness) can be thought of as offering to
demonstratethat his conduct was a .'product'. of his mental condition. By
contrast, individuals with mental retardation and other significant
intellectual impairments are not .'required" by their condition to behave in
a preciseway. Rather, their actions in life are profoundly influenced by
their level of understandingand ability to make reasonedchoices.
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demonstrated
by such direct and concrete evidence does not
make it any less real. Nor does it lessen its relevance to the
jury's task of assessjngmjtjgating circumstan(.- s in detemlinjng an appropriate punjshment.
Personswho have substantial cognitive impairments are no
more "predestined" to commjt criminal acts than are those
with mental retardation or any other mental condition.~() In
this sense, a defendant will never be able to p-:"lvea perfect
causal nexus to the crime. But the jnterplay between an
indjvidual's mental djsability and human volition is both
contextual and complex. It does not admjt of a sjmplistic yesor-no judicial formula. The impact of a person's cognjtive
disability, and how it has shaped his functioning in everyday

life, will inevitably have a powerful influence on his
behavior. In this sense,there will alK'a)'s be a relevant
"nexus" between the defendant's cognitive impairment and
the offense.

The Fifth Circuit's requirementthat a causalconnectionbe
demonstratedbefore a jury can consider the potentially
mitigating significanceof a defendant'scognitive disability is
unwarranted.In an effort to satisfy this prerequisite,clinical
wjtnessesmay be askedto opine conclusively on the causal
connection. Given the intricacy of the relationshipbetweena
disability and the defendant'sbehavior,suchtestimonywould
be of questionablevalue.~1 More fundamentally,no valid
purposeis served by requiring such testimony in pursuit of
advance"proof' of the connectionbefore it can be evaluated
20 It

is noteworthythat while this Coun l,.'learlyunderstoodthat Johnny

Penry's mental retardation was rt:le\.anl It) detem1ining the appropriate
penalty for his crime. it did nt)1rt:4uirt: th..1he demonstrate a "nexus" in
order to obtain a jury instrUI,.'li(l"Ih~tl "(luld allow a jury to evaluate its
significance. Similarly. the pr(llt:l"ll(l" Irtl"1 the death penalty recognized
by this Court in Atkins was "'II 1IIIIIIedt(1th(l,e defendantswho prove that
their mental retardation "caused" Iht:lr cramr:'.
21SeeHalleck et al.. Sllprl/ n'llt: I (). al ~4~,
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by a jury. The Fifth Circuit has offered no justification for
this requirement.

C. Jurors Must Be Allowed To Evaluate The
Mitigating Relevance Of Any Significant
Impairment Of Cognitive Functioning.
Peoplewho havesubstantiallyimpairedcognitive functioning have many relevant characteristicsin common with
individuals who have mental retardation.22
The measurement
of their IQs may be nearly as (or comparably) severe,but
more significantly, the level at which they percejve and
understandthe world and function in society.as well as thejr
experiencesin life, have crucial parallels to the lives of
peoplewith mentalretardation.

22There are three possible reasons why such individuals do not fall
witrun the definition of menta! retardation. Some will be outside the
definition because their disability first manifested in adulthood (i.e.,
beyond the .'developmental period"). This would include disabilities
arising from brain injuries and dementias that occurred after childhood.
Others will be outside the definition if, becauseof successfulprovision of
supports, their adaptive behavior is no longer impaired enough to
constitute mental retardation. (While such people exist in society, see
AAMR, Mental Retardation: Definition. Classiftcatiol1, al1d Systems of
Supports 9, 145-68 (10th ed. 2002) [hereafter "AAMR 2002"], in the
experience of anlici, they are seldom encountered in the criminal justice
system.) Still others will be outside the definition becausetheir measured
intellectual impairment places them above the boundary of mental
retardation. In this subgroup. anlic; are referring to impaim1entsbetween
one and two standard deviations below average (i.e.. with IQ scores
roughly between 85 and the low- to mid- 7()s). See infra note 23. Seealso
Ruth Luckasson, The Cril11;nal Justice .\'ystem and People M'ith Mild
Cognitive Lilnitations. in The ForgO1tt"l Generatioll: The Status and
Challenges of Adults M'ith Mild C(),1,'11it;\'e
Limitations 347, 348-49
(Alexander J. Tymchuk, K. Charlie L41kin& Ruth Luckasson eds., 2001)

[hereafter"F orgotlenGeneration"J.
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Individuals with cognitive impainnents that place them
above the boundary of mental retardation23share many of the
23Amici respectfully suggest that the tenn ..borderline" is problematic
in discussing these individuals, Despite its apparent aptness, it has
considerable potential for confusion becauseof its multiple mearlings in
the clinical literature, For a relatively brief period of time (roughly the
1960s) the definition of mental retardation encompassedpeople whose IQ
was between one and two standard deviations below the mean, and this
group was denominated ..borderline retarded." See Am, Ass'n on Mental
Deficiency (now renamed AAMR), A Manual on Terminolog.\' and
Classification in Mental Retardation 3, 86 (1961), This classification
system proved unsatisfactory becauseit was perceived as unnecessarily
stigmatizing the individuals so labeled, and in all subsequentrevisions.
the definition of mental retardation has identified the boundary as two
standard deviations, E.g., Am, Ass'n on Mental Deficiency. Manual on
Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardatioll 18 (1973 rev.),
See gellerally AAMR 2002, supra note 22. at 26-27, (Obviously,
abandoning the classification of ..borderline retarded" did not change the
actual impainnent those individuals experienced. but merely attempted to
spare them an undesirable source of stigmatization, Andrea Zetlin &
Michael Munaugh, Whatever Happened to Those M'ith Borderline IQs?,
94 Am, J, Mental Retardation 463 (1990); Luckasson, supra note 22, at
352,) Couns have frequently used the tenn in inconsistent and confusing
ways, sometimes describing as .'borderline" individuals whose disability
would have placed them in that category in the earlier system. and at other
times, using the same tenn to describe people who are within the current
definition of mental retardation, but whose disability places them
relatively near the boundary (i.e" two standarddeviations),
To funher confuse matters, '.borderline" is also a mental illness tenn
used by psychiatrists and other clinicians to describe a fonn of mental
illness that bears no relationship at all to the intellectual impainnents at
issue in this case, See gellerall.,' APA, DSM-IV-TR, supra note 6, at 706710; Michael H, Stone, Tht' Fate of Borderlille Patients: S"ccessful
Outcome and Psychiatric Practi('t' 9-11 (1990).
For somewhat different reasons,care is also appropriate in the use of
the tenn "mild mental retardation." When professionals in the field
employed a descriptive classification of intensity, they chose .'mild,"
'.moderate." ..severe," and "profound" as the labels for subgroups of
people with mental retardation. Under that taxonomy. roughly 90% of the
individuals who fall within the definition of mental retardation were
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1ife experiencesof people with mental retardatjon.24They
face sjmilarll difficult c~ndi~~ons
jn terms of empl~yment.~5
hea1thcare.2 and education." They also sharean Increased
labeled as having .'mild" mental retardation. (That frequency is even
higher among individuals facing criminal prosecutions.) Unlike the term
..borderline," all of the individuals described as having ..mild" mental
retardation fall K'ithin the definition of mental retardation, and thus all
come under the protection of Atkins. Although some clinicians continue
to employ it, the ..mild/moderate/severe/profound"descriptive system has
been rejected by AAMR for more than a decade, in part becauseof its
overemphasis on IQ scores (as compared to an individual's practical
disabilities), and also out of concern about the misleading impression left
by the term ..mild." AAMR 2002, supra note 22, at 26, 207.
24See Glenn T. Fujiura. Continuum of Intellectual Disability:
Demographic Evidence for the "Forgotten Generation," 41 Mental
Retardation 420, 426 (2003).
2SAlexander J. Tymchuk, Family Life: Experiences of People K'ith
Mild Cognitive Limitations, in Forgotten Generation, supra note 22, at
249 (..The majority of individuals with mild cognitive limitations live
in poverty because they are either unemployed or employed in lowpaying jobs. ").
26Deborah M. Spitalnik & Sheryl White-Scon, Access to Health
Services: Improving the Availability and Quality of Health Servicesfor
People K'ith Mild Cognith'e Limitations, in Forgotten Generation, supra
note 22, at 203, 206 (..Individuals with mild cognitive limitations as well
as people with more severe disabilities are at a medical disadvantage
and sharesimilar disincentives to health care. These disincentives include
lack of access to care, nonexistent or unavailable medical histories,
fragmentation of medical care, lack of trained health professionals in
the area of disabilities, lack of transportation, and lack of continuity
of care.").
27Donald L. MacMillan et al., C,lrrent Plight of Borderline Students:
Where Do The.vBelong.'. 33 Educ. & Training in Mental Retardation &
Developmental Disabilities 83, 92 (1998) (..Differences between
borderline and averageability referred studentswere far more pronounced
than differences between borderline and students with mental
retardation."); id. ("We believe that these results argue for 'differences of
degree rather than kind' when we talk about children ranging in IQ from
the mid-60s to the mid-80!;.}.
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likelihood of experiencing cognitive and behavioral difficulties associated with very low birth weight or the effects of
fetal exposure to alcohol.2M

As with people who have mental retardation.the combination of their cognitive disability with abuse and other
problems in childhood can compound the difficulties they
encounteras adults.29 And the same problems can coexist
with (and, ironically, can mask) mental illness and other
psychologicalproblems.3OSimilarly, these individuals also
experiencethe difficulties to coping and succeedingin life

28

Glen P. Aylward, Cognith'e and NeuropsychologicalO,ltcomes:

More than IQ Scores, 8 Mental Retardation & Developmental Disability
ResearchReviews 234, 239 (2002): Campbell M. Clark et al., Structural
and Functional Brain Integrity of Fetal Alcohol Syndron,ei" Nonretarded
Cases, 105 Pediatrics 1096, 1096-97 (2000): Kimberly A. Kerns et al.,
Cognitive Deficits in Nonretarded Adults K'ith Fetal Alcohol Sy"drome,
30 J. Learning Disabilities 685 (1997): Sarah N. Mattson et al.,
Teratogenic Effects of Alcohol on Brain a"d Beha\'ior, 25 Alcohol Res. &
Health 185 (2001).
29

SeegenerallyStephenA. Richardson,HeleneKoller & Mandy Katz,

Relationship of Upbringing to Later Behavior Disturbance of Mildly
Mentally Retarded Young People, 90 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 1 (1985):
Iris Tan Mink, C. Edward Meyers & Kazuo Nihira, Taxonon,y of Famil.\'
Life Styles: II. Hon,es K'ith Slow-Learni"g Children, 89 Am. J. Mental
Deficiency 111, 116 (1984). Seealso Penry, 492 U.S. at 319-28.
30See Philip G. Rourke & Donald M. Quinlan, Psychological
Characteristics of Problen, Children at the Borderline of Mental
Retardation, 40 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 59, 60 (1973):
Steven Reiss, People K'ith a Dual Diagnosis: An,er;ca's PoK'erless
Population, in Forgotten Generation. supra note 22, at 275: Sharon A.
Borthwick-Duffy & Richard K. Eyman, Who Are the Dually Diagnosed?,
94 Am. J. Mental Retardation 586, 591-92 (1990) (reponing greater
incidence of mental illness and aggressive behavior at higher IQ levels
among cognitively impaired individuals): Steven Reiss, Grant W. Levitan
& Joseph Szyszko, Emotional Disturbance a"d Mental Retardation:
Diagnostic OvershadoK'ing,86 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 567 (1982).
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imposed b)' reducedcognitive ability.31These problems. in
turn. are often exacerbated by the stigmatization the
individuals experiencefrom being identified as having mental
disabilities.32And while all of theseeffects can be lifelong.
the clinical literature strongly suggeststhat these problems
are experiencedmost acutely in late adolescenceand young
adulthood. particularly in the process of transition from
schoollife.3
Defendants with other fonns of substantial cognitive
impainnents, who may also be denied Penr.,' instructions
under the Fifth Circuit's test, present similar issues. In
particular, individuals with traumaticbrain injuries,34various
forms of dementia,35and some persons with epilepsy or
31See generally Harold G. Levine & L.L. Langness. Everyday
Cognition Among Mildly Mentally Retarded Adults: An Ethnographic
Approach. 90 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 18,25 (1985).
32SeeJim L

Turner.Keith T. Kernan& SusanGelphman.
Speech

Etiquel1e in a Sheltered Workshop, in Lives in Process: Mildly Retarded
Adults in a Large Cil)' 43, 60-68 (Roben B. Edgenon ed.. 1984)
(discussing intense negative reaction to mention of mental retardation).
33See, e.g., Andrea G. Zetlin & Gale M. Morrison. Adaptation
Through ~he L(fe Span. in Handbook of Mental Retardation and
Development 481-503 (Jacob A. Burack. Roben M. Hodapp & Edward
Zigler eds.. 1998). and sourcescited therein.
J4See, e.g., Marilyn F. Kraus. Nellropsychiatric Sequelae: Assessment
and Pharnlacologic Inten'entions, in Trallnlatic Brain Injury 173. 176-78
(Donald W. Marion ed.. 1999) (discussing behavioral disturbances.
aggression.and cognitive impairments): William W. McKinlay & Anna J.
Watkiss, Cognith'e and Behc/\'ioral Effects of Brain Injury, in
Rehabilitation of the Adilit and Child MoithTraunlatic Brain Injury 74. 7782 (Mitchell Rosenthalet al. ed~..3d ed. 1999).
3S.S"ee,e.g., APA, D.S'M-I\"-TR at 147-71; Nancy L. Mace. The
Managenlent of Pro bien, B"ht/,.ivrs. in Denlentia Care: Patient, Family,
and Conlnluni~' 74 (Nancy L. Mace ed.. 1990): Peter V. Rabins.
Constantine G. LyketMJs& Cynthia D. Steele. Practical Dementia Care
156-70 (1999) (di~cussing mo()C.)
problem,. hallucinations. paranoia. and
delusions); Myron F. Weiner & Linda Teri. Ps.\'chologicaland Behavioral
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seizure disorders36 may have comparable claims to an
opportunity for jurors to consider the mitigating relevance of
their disabilities.

U. THE OBSTACLES IMPOSED BY THE
FIFfH CIRCUIT ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
THIS COURT'S DECISIONS REGARDING
MITIGA TING EVIDENCE.
This Court has consistently emphasized the central
importance of the considerationof mitigating evidence in
evaluating whether the death penalty is warranted in an
individual defendant'scase. See,e,g" Hitchcock \', Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 399 (1987);Lockett,438 U.S. at 605.
Accommodatingthe Texas systemof special questionsto
this constitutionalprinciple has not beeneasy.37This Court
found the structureof the Texassystemto be constitutionally
acceptable.in large part. becauseby "authorizing the defense
to bring before the jury at the separatesentencinghearing
whatevermitigating circumstancesrelating to the indh'idual
defendant can be adduced, Texas has assured that the
Management, in The Dementias: Diagllosis, Treatnlellt, alld Research 181
(Myron F. Weiner & Anne M. Lipton eds.. 3d ed. 2003).
36Oscar Doval, Moises Gaviria & Andres M. Kanner, Frontal Lobe
Dysfunction in Epilepsy, in Ps.\'chiatric Issues ill Epileps)' 261, 264-67
(Alan B. Ettinger & Andres M. Kanner eds.. 2001) (discussing cognitive
deficits and psychiatric symptoms); Alan B. Ettinger & Alan L. Steinberg,
Psychiatric Issues in Patients \1'ith Epilepsy and Mental Retardation, in
id. at 181, 185-86 (discussing impulse control disorders); Steven C.
Schachter, Aggressive Beha,'i(}r ill Epil('ps,\', in ido at 201. 206 (citing
studies suggesting aggressive or violenl behavior may be due to side
effects of anti-epileptic drugs).
37The issueposed in theseI:~'C.'S
apP'.'~r,It) apply exclusively to Texas.
Oregon, whose statute also illlOt\rpt)ralC."
IIIC.'special question format, has
determined that defendants art: entitled It 1 a jury instruction that invites

consideration of all relevant 11IIIIgaiingC.'\idence. .SeeState v. Wagner,
786 P.2d 93, 101 (Or. 1990) (en banc).
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sentencingjury will have adequateguidanceto enable it to
perfOrnl its sentencingfunction." Jllrek \'. Te.,-as.428 U.S.
262,276 (1976) (opinion of Stewan,Powell. and Stevens.JJ.)
(emphasissupplied). Over the years.the Coun has found it
necessaryto resolverecurringquestionsabout which types of
mitigating evidenceare amenableto fair considerationunder
this system and which types require a separateinstruction
regardingmitigation. SeeFranklin \'. L)'naugh,487 U.S. 164.
]85 (]988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
Penry, 492 U.S. at 328; Johnsonv. Te~\"as,
509 U.S. at 369;
Penry v, Johnson,532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001) (Penr.vIi).
But as the Court has wrestled with these cases, it has
always emphasizedthat the State cannot place imponant
mitigating evidencebeyondthe jurors' effective reach. This
Court has only rejected claims that the jury should have
receivedan additional instruction when it was satisfiedthat a
particular type of mitigating evidence could be unambiguously evaluatedunderthe specialquestions.
The Fifth Circuit's Maddenrequirements.separatelyand in
their aggregation, fail to recognize that other intellectual
impairmentsare no more readily cognizableunderthe special
questionregime than was mental retardation. By excluding
substantial impairments of cognitive functioning from its
implementationof this Court's clear directive in Penry, the
Fifth Circuit hasconsignedindividuals with thosedisabilities
to the same dilemma previously faced by defendantswith
mentalretardation:the jury hasbeengiven no straightforward
and unencumberedopportunity to consider the disability's
mitigating significance.
III. JURORS ~ll'ST BE FREE TO PERFORM
THEIR VIT AI. "~UNCTION OF EV ALVA TING
THE
MITI(;,\ 'fIN(;
SIGNIFICANCE
OF
MENTAl.. DIS:\IJILIT" ":VIDENCE.
As this Coun ha.~cmph&1sized.
jurors must not only have an
opportunity to hear rclc\'&1ntmitig~lting evidence, they must

")")
-w-

be given a clear and logical opportunity to evaluateand act
upon that evidence.3RThe Fifth Circuit's rule deprivesjurors
of suchan opportunityin casesinvolving potentially powerful
mitigating evidenceof a defendant's substantially impaired
cognitive functioning.
Other cognitive disabilities are no more amenableto fair
evaluationwjthin the context of Texas' specialquestionsthan
mental retardationwas in Penr.v. Like Penry's claim, such
disabilities are incapable of full mitigatjng consideratjon
under the "prospective dangerousness"question, because,
exactly ljke mental retardation,they may be seenas a "twoedgedsword" regardingfuture conduct.39 The Fifth Circuit
has offered no reasoning to demonstratethat this Court's
concerns about jurors' ambivalent views about future
38Most State legislatures that have enacted statutes concerning mental
retardation and the death penalty have recognized the importance of
preserving the jury's role in evaluating mitigating evidence that has not
been found to warrant exemption from the penalty. Some explicitly
mention mental disability as a mitigating circumstance for casesin which
the defendant has not been found to have mental retardation. See, e.g..
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703.02(C) (West Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2005 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15A-I04(14)(c)(iii)
(2003). See also Murph.\' v".State, 54 P.3d 556. 568 (Okla. Crim. App.
2002). Other States explicitly provide that an adverse ruling on the
question of mental retardation may not be communicated to the jury
which will consider mitigating evidence. 2003 CAL. LEGIS. SERVo700
(West); IDAHOCODE§ 19-2515A (Michie 2003); N.M. STAT.ANN. § 3120A-2.1(C) (Michie Supp. 2000).
39Penry, 492 U.S. at 324. Both reduced culpability and concern about
future dangerousness were prominent themes in the era of eugenic
approachesto cognitive impainnents early in the 20th Century. See. e.g..
Henry Herbert Goddard. The Criminal Imbecile: An Analysis of Three
Remarkable Murder Cases(1915). Although tragically misguided beliefs
about both eugenic sterilization and segregation have been emphatically
rejected in light of modern understanding of people with disabilities. it is
noteworthy that even the harshest of those earlier views recognized the
reduced culpability of the individuals described.
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dangerousnessare in any way different for other fonlls of
cognitive impainllent.
Yet despitejurors' concernsabout future dangerousness.
there is every reasonto concludethat they would find these
cognitive disabilitiespotentially mitigating jn individual cases
jf offered a clear opponunjty to considerthem.
It is widely recognizedthat evidence regarding a defendant's mental impainnent may be amongthe most persuasive
mitigation evidence in jurors' estimation. See Williams t'.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). See generally Garvey,
supra note 12, at 1564. While this evidencecan be given
focus by expen witnesses,jurors are likely to begin with an
instinctive understanding that individuals with cognitive
disabilities are less culpable for their acts than "defendants
who have no such excuse." Penry, 492 U.S. at 322. Jurors'
understandingof this basic truth will include ponrayals of
such individuals in literature and popular culture.4()But in
addition, in light of the increasededucationalopponunities
for studentswith disabilities over the last twenty-five years,41
jurors' life experiencesare likely to include more interactions
with peoplewho havecognitive impainnentsthan would have
beentrue in earlier generations.42
40 Suchaccountswill

rangefrom charactersin literary fiction, suchas

Of Mice and Men and Native Son, to ponrayals on television in programs
like LA. Law and Life Goes On, and films such as Rain Man, Being
There, Sling Blade. and Forrest Gump. While these portrayals vary
somewhat as to their precise clinical accuracy, they convey a basic
understanding of how a disabled individual's intellectual limitations
intersect with other aspectsof their characterand behaviors.
41See generally Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
P.L. 94-142, now codified as Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
20 V.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (2<XX».
42Cf Junean Krajewski & Thomas Flaherty, Attitudes o/High School
Students To~'ard Indh'iduals ~'ith Metrtal Retardation. 38 Mental
Retardation 154, 160 (2<XX».
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But jurors' instinctive andexperientialunderstandingabout
people with cognitive impainnents cannot be given fair
evaluationwithout an instruction that pennits the disabilities
to be considered. "A sentencermust be allowed to give .filll
considerationandfull effect to mitigating circumstances.For
it is only when the jury is given a vehicle for expressingits
reasonedmoral responseto that evidence in rendering its
sentencingdecision, that we can be sure that the jury has
treated the defendantas a uniquely individual human being
and has made a reliable determination that death is the

.
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appropnate sentence.

CONCLUSION
For thesereasons,amici urge reversalof the judgment of
the Court of Appeals.
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